Introduction: Cross-Border Data Transfers in the Turkish Fintech Sector

Cross-border data transfers have become one of the most important compliance issues for financial technology companies operating in Türkiye.

A modern fintech business rarely operates through a completely domestic technological infrastructure.

A Turkish payment institution may use an international fraud-detection provider.

An electronic money company may use a global customer relationship management platform.

A crypto asset service provider may obtain blockchain analytics services from a company established abroad.

An open banking business may rely on international software developers.

A Banking as a Service platform may belong to a multinational corporate group whose risk, compliance or analytics teams operate outside Türkiye.

Even where a fintech company believes that all of its primary customer information is “stored in Turkey,” international data transfers may still occur through:

• foreign cloud infrastructure;
• overseas backup facilities;
• global SaaS products;
• remote technical support;
• foreign group-company access;
• customer analytics systems;
• fraud and cybersecurity services;
• international customer support;
• external KYC providers;
• software telemetry and monitoring tools.

For this reason, understanding cross-border data transfers under Turkish law requires much more than asking where the main production database is physically located.

The central data protection rule is found in Article 9 of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (“KVKK”).

Article 9 was fundamentally amended by Law No. 7499, published on 12 March 2024. The new cross-border transfer regime entered into force on 1 June 2024 and replaced the earlier structure with a three-level system based on adequacy decisions, appropriate safeguards and limited exceptional transfers.

The reform was followed by the By-Law on the Procedures and Principles for the Transfer of Personal Data Abroad, published on 10 July 2024, as well as official standard contracts and Binding Corporate Rules documentation adopted by the Personal Data Protection Board.

For fintech companies, however, KVKK is only one part of the analysis.

Banks, payment institutions, electronic money institutions and crypto businesses may also be subject to financial-sector information systems, confidentiality, outsourcing and localisation requirements.

Therefore, the central rule is:

A cross-border data transfer must comply both with KVKK and with any stricter sector-specific financial regulation applicable to the fintech business.

This article explains the legal framework for cross-border data transfers for fintech companies in Turkey as of July 2026.

1. What Is a Cross-Border Personal Data Transfer?

A cross-border transfer occurs where personal data is transferred from Türkiye to a recipient located abroad.

The concept should not be approached only in terms of physically sending a database file to another country.

In a modern fintech environment, a transfer may potentially arise where personal data is:

• uploaded to a foreign cloud environment;
• disclosed to an overseas affiliate;
• made available to a foreign processor;
• transmitted to an international fraud provider;
• accessed by a foreign technical-support team;
• stored in a backup environment located abroad;
• processed through a global SaaS application.

The actual technical data flow therefore matters more than the commercial description of the service.

A fintech may purchase software from a Turkish reseller while the underlying processing occurs abroad.

Conversely, a foreign-owned technology company may operate infrastructure physically located in Türkiye.

A proper transfer analysis should therefore ask:

Where does the information actually go, who can access it and for what purpose?

2. The 2024 Reform of KVKK Article 9

Before June 2024, Türkiye’s international transfer regime was significantly more restrictive in practical operation.

Law No. 7499 fundamentally amended Article 9 and introduced a more structured transfer mechanism.

The new Article 9 became effective on 1 June 2024.

The Personal Data Protection Authority describes the current framework as a three-stage system:

1. transfer on the basis of an adequacy decision;
2. where no adequacy decision exists, transfer using an appropriate safeguard;
3. where neither an adequacy decision nor an appropriate safeguard exists, transfer only under one of the specifically defined occasional exceptional circumstances.

This reform materially changed the compliance strategy available to multinational fintech companies.

In particular, standard contractual clauses and Binding Corporate Rules became express statutory transfer tools.

3. The Three-Level Cross-Border Transfer System

The current regime should generally be analysed sequentially.

Level One: Adequacy Decision

The first question is whether the Personal Data Protection Board has issued an adequacy decision regarding:

• the country;
• a particular sector within that country; or
• an international organisation.

Where an adequacy decision exists, and the ordinary processing conditions under Articles 5 or 6 are also satisfied, personal data can be transferred under Article 9.

Level Two: Appropriate Safeguards

If there is no adequacy decision, a fintech should determine whether one of the appropriate safeguards in Article 9 can be implemented.

For private-sector fintech businesses, the most relevant mechanisms are generally:

• standard contracts;
• Binding Corporate Rules;
• written undertakings approved by the Board.

Level Three: Occasional Exceptional Transfers

Only where no adequacy decision or appropriate safeguard can be used may the company consider one of the exceptional transfer grounds.

These exceptions are intended for occasional rather than regular transfers.

This hierarchy is crucial.

A fintech company should not skip directly to customer consent merely because obtaining a proper transfer framework appears administratively inconvenient.

4. Are There Any Adequate Countries in 2026?

As of July 2026, the Turkish Personal Data Protection Authority states that the Board has not yet designated any country as providing adequate protection under the current Article 9 system.

This has major practical consequences.

There is currently no general rule under which a Turkish fintech can simply state:

“The data is going to Germany, the United Kingdom or another developed privacy jurisdiction, so the transfer is automatically lawful.”

Even transfers to jurisdictions with sophisticated data protection regimes generally require another valid Article 9 mechanism unless a future Turkish adequacy decision applies.

This makes appropriate safeguards particularly important for international fintech groups.

5. Standard Contracts: The Most Practical Transfer Mechanism for Many Fintechs

For many fintech companies, standard contracts are likely to be the most practical method for establishing an appropriate safeguard.

The Personal Data Protection Board approved official standard contracts through its decision dated 4 June 2024.

Four different contract modules exist:

1. Controller to Controller
2. Controller to Processor
3. Processor to Processor
4. Processor to Controller

Selecting the correct module requires first determining the legal role of both parties.

For example:

A Turkish payment institution sending customer information to an independent foreign fraud-scoring business that determines its own processing purposes may involve a different transfer relationship from a cloud provider processing information only under the Turkish institution’s instructions.

Incorrect controller/processor classification can therefore result in the wrong standard contract being used.

6. Controller-to-Processor Transfers

One of the most common fintech transfer structures involves a Turkish fintech acting as data controller and a foreign vendor acting as data processor.

Examples may include:

• cloud infrastructure;
• KYC technology;
• customer support;
• CRM;
• transaction monitoring;
• fraud detection;
• application hosting.

Where the foreign company processes information only according to the fintech company’s documented instructions, the controller-to-processor standard contract may be relevant.

However, companies should avoid automatically classifying every vendor as a processor.

Where the service provider determines independent purposes for processing or combines customer information with its own independent data ecosystem, it may potentially be a separate controller.

The legal relationship should be examined according to actual processing rather than merely according to the heading used in the commercial contract.

7. Five-Business-Day Notification Requirement

A critical feature of the Turkish standard contract system is the notification obligation.

Article 9 requires a standard contract to be notified to the Personal Data Protection Authority within five business days after it is signed.

The Authority has established an electronic Standard Contract Notification Module to facilitate these notifications.

This requirement creates a significant compliance risk for large fintech businesses using many foreign vendors.

A company may successfully negotiate and sign an otherwise valid standard contract but still create regulatory exposure if nobody submits the required notification.

Fintech companies should therefore maintain a cross-border transfer register including:

• foreign recipient;
• recipient country;
• controller/processor role;
• data categories;
• processing purpose;
• standard contract module;
• signature date;
• notification deadline;
• notification completion date.

Responsibility for the five-business-day filing should be clearly assigned internally.

8. The Standard Contract Cannot Be Freely Rewritten

A standard contract is not an ordinary commercial agreement that parties may negotiate without restriction.

The Authority’s guidance makes clear that the prescribed text should generally remain unchanged, except in relation to clauses specifically designed as optional or alternative provisions.

The Authority has warned that additions, deletions or amendments outside the permitted areas may undermine the standard contract’s status as an appropriate safeguard.

Commercial provisions can still be handled separately where they do not conflict with the standard contract.

For example, parties may have:

• a SaaS agreement;
• data processing agreement;
• service-level agreement;
• cybersecurity annex,

alongside the statutory transfer contract.

But the standard contract itself should not be converted into a heavily negotiated bespoke commercial document.

9. The Turkish Version Must Be Properly Executed

The Authority has also clarified several practical execution requirements.

Where a standard contract is signed in more than one language, the Turkish contractual text must also be signed by both parties.

Where a bilingual two-column structure is used, signatures must be placed appropriately in relation to the Turkish text.

The persons signing the agreement must also have valid authority to represent the relevant parties.

For foreign fintech groups, this creates a practical document-management issue.

The compliance team may need to obtain:

• corporate authority documents;
• powers of attorney;
• apostilles where applicable;
• notarised Turkish translations.

The Authority’s guidance states that supporting foreign-language documents submitted with the notification should be accompanied by notarised Turkish translations where required.

10. Avoid Backdating Standard Contracts

Another important practical warning concerns retroactive effectiveness.

The Authority has stated that where signatures are completed on a later date, the contract should not contain wording pretending that the standard contract entered into force at an earlier historical date.

This is particularly relevant for fintech companies discovering that an existing foreign vendor relationship was implemented without a proper transfer mechanism.

The correct approach is not to create an artificial historical contract.

Instead, the company should regularise the transfer lawfully from the actual date of execution and separately assess any prior compliance exposure.

11. Binding Corporate Rules for Multinational Fintech Groups

For large multinational groups, signing separate standard contracts for hundreds of recurring intra-group data flows may become inefficient.

Binding Corporate Rules (“BCRs”) provide another appropriate safeguard.

BCRs are designed for transfers within a group of undertakings engaged in common economic activity.

The Board has published separate application forms and guidance for:

• controller BCRs;
• processor BCRs.

BCRs can be particularly attractive to:

• multinational banks;
• global payment groups;
• international crypto businesses;
• financial technology groups with centralised analytics;
• multinational cybersecurity and fraud-monitoring structures.

However, BCRs require significant governance maturity.

The group must demonstrate that binding privacy protections apply across participating companies.

12. BCRs Are an Operational Transfer Mechanism in 2026

BCRs are no longer merely theoretical within the Turkish system.

In 2026, the Personal Data Protection Board publicly announced the approval of a Binding Corporate Rules application submitted by a Turkish technology company.

The relevant BCR was approved on 20 May 2026 under Article 9.

This development is important for multinational fintech groups because it demonstrates that the post-2024 BCR procedure is being actively implemented.

For organisations with large volumes of predictable intra-group transfers, BCRs may therefore become a strategically attractive alternative to maintaining numerous bilateral standard contracts.

13. Written Undertakings With Board Approval

Another appropriate safeguard involves a written undertaking containing adequate data protection guarantees together with approval from the Personal Data Protection Board.

This mechanism may be useful where:

• the standard contract does not adequately fit the proposed transfer structure;
• sector-specific circumstances require bespoke provisions;
• the transfer arrangement is unusually complex.

Unlike a standard contract, this route generally requires Board approval before the transfer can be relied upon under that mechanism.

For most ordinary SaaS procurement arrangements, standard contracts may be more efficient.

However, customised undertakings remain relevant for complex financial-sector arrangements.

14. Public-Sector Agreements

Article 9 also permits appropriate safeguards through certain agreements between Turkish public bodies or professional public organisations and foreign public institutions or international organisations, together with Board permission.

This route is usually less relevant to a private fintech company but forms part of the complete statutory transfer system.

15. Occasional Exceptional Transfers

Where there is:

• no adequacy decision; and
• no appropriate safeguard,

Article 9 permits transfers only in specifically enumerated exceptional situations, provided that the transfer is occasional.

The Authority identifies circumstances including:

• explicit consent after the person is informed of possible risks;
• transfer necessary for performance of a contract with the individual;
• transfer necessary for a contract concluded in the individual’s interest;
• overriding public interest;
• establishment, exercise or protection of legal rights;
• protection of life or physical integrity;
• transfer from certain publicly accessible registers.

The crucial word is occasional.

The Authority states that these exceptions should be narrowly interpreted and are intended for transfers that are not regular, continuous or systematic.

16. Why Explicit Consent Is Usually Not a Good Long-Term Cloud Strategy

One of the most common compliance mistakes is attempting to base recurring international cloud processing entirely on customer consent.

For example, a fintech may say:

“The customer consented to international data transfer, therefore our permanent foreign cloud architecture is lawful.”

Under the current Article 9 structure, the exceptional consent route applies to occasional transfers where adequacy and appropriate safeguards are unavailable.

A permanent cloud architecture processing customer information every day is generally not naturally characterised as an occasional transfer.

Therefore, regular foreign SaaS and cloud arrangements should usually be structured using an appropriate safeguard such as a standard contract or BCR rather than treating exceptional consent as the primary long-term mechanism.

17. Article 9 Does Not Replace Articles 5 and 6

A valid cross-border transfer mechanism does not make the underlying processing automatically lawful.

Article 9 expressly operates together with the ordinary conditions governing processing under Articles 5 and 6.

Therefore, a fintech needs:

1. a lawful basis to process the personal data in the first place; and
2. a lawful mechanism allowing that data to be transferred abroad.

For example, a Turkish payment institution may need customer identity information to comply with legal KYC obligations.

That may provide the domestic processing basis.

But if the information is subsequently transferred to a foreign technology provider, Article 9 must also be satisfied.

The two legal questions should be analysed separately.

18. Foreign Cloud Services and Fintech Companies

Cloud computing is probably the most common cross-border transfer issue for fintech businesses.

A fintech may use international services for:

• infrastructure hosting;
• databases;
• authentication;
• application monitoring;
• logging;
• customer support;
• communications;
• fraud scoring;
• business intelligence.

A proper cloud analysis should map:

Primary Data Location

Where is the live customer information hosted?

Backup Location

Are backups replicated abroad?

Support Access

Can foreign engineers access production data?

Sub-Processors

Does the cloud provider use additional companies?

Telemetry

Do logs or application diagnostics leave Türkiye?

Disaster Recovery

Is the recovery environment abroad?

A service does not become a purely domestic service merely because the customer selects a Turkish billing address.

19. Remote Access From Abroad

Physical storage location is only one part of the analysis.

Suppose a fintech stores customer information in an Istanbul data centre but allows engineers in London, Dubai or Singapore to remotely access production records.

The company should assess whether that foreign access results in personal data being made available abroad and therefore requires an Article 9 transfer mechanism.

This is why a cross-border compliance project should map access rights, not merely servers.

The same issue arises where a multinational group’s central compliance team can log into a Turkish database from another jurisdiction.

20. Global SaaS Platforms

Global SaaS systems commonly create hidden transfer risks.

Examples include:

• CRM;
• ticketing platforms;
• fraud tools;
• analytics;
• email marketing;
• application monitoring;
• identity verification;
• internal collaboration tools.

A fintech company should not rely solely on the vendor’s statement that it is “GDPR compliant.”

Turkish compliance requires a separate Article 9 analysis.

The relevant questions include:

• which entity contracts with the Turkish fintech;
• which entity actually processes the data;
• what processor/sub-processor structure exists;
• where data is transferred;
• which Turkish standard contract module applies.

21. Payment and Electronic Money Companies Face an Additional Regulatory Layer

Payment institutions and electronic money institutions should be particularly cautious.

The Personal Data Protection Authority’s new Good Practices Guide on the Protection of Personal Data in the Payment and Electronic Money Sector, published in July 2026 together with TÖDEB, specifically addresses data transfers alongside controller/processor status, legal grounds and data security.

However, payment and electronic money companies are also subject to CBRT information systems requirements.

Therefore, satisfying KVKK Article 9 does not automatically mean the proposed technology infrastructure is permitted under payment-services regulation.

22. CBRT Cloud Restrictions for Payment and E-Money Institutions

The CBRT’s information systems framework contains specific restrictions relating to cloud infrastructure.

The current CBRT Community Cloud Guide quotes Article 16(7) of the relevant Information Systems Communiqué and states that institutions may use cloud services established within Türkiye.

For cloud environments processing sensitive customer information, personal data or customer-identifiable information, the framework restricts the model to specified private-cloud arrangements, subject to the recognised community-cloud structure and regulatory conditions.

The same CBRT guidance requires primary and secondary systems and backup centres dedicated to qualifying community cloud services to be located in Türkiye.

This has an important practical implication:

A standard contract under KVKK may make a cross-border transfer lawful under data protection law, yet the same architecture may still be impermissible for a payment or e-money institution because of CBRT sector requirements.

The stricter sector rule must also be respected.

23. Customer-Free Development Environments

The CBRT framework contains a notable distinction for test and development environments.

The Community Cloud Guide indicates that the special cloud restriction described in Article 16(7) does not apply in the same manner where the institution uses cloud services for test and development systems that do not contain customer data, provided that necessary security measures are taken.

This demonstrates the value of data minimisation in fintech development.

Developers should avoid copying live customer databases into foreign test environments.

Synthetic or anonymised datasets may significantly reduce regulatory exposure.

24. Cross-Border Payment Cooperation Is Also Regulated Separately

Payment and electronic money institutions may also engage in authorised cooperation with foreign legal entities under the Payment Services Regulation.

The Regulation contains separate requirements concerning international cooperation, including requirements relating to Turkish record keeping and transaction audit trails.

For certain authorised cross-border payment cooperation structures, transaction documents and records must be maintained domestically by the Turkish institution.

Therefore, a fintech should not assume that Article 9 alone governs every international relationship.

The financial-services arrangement itself may require separate CBRT permission and operational conditions.

25. Banks: KVKK Is Not the Only Confidentiality Regime

Banks and Banking as a Service structures face another important layer: banking secrecy.

The BRSA continues to maintain the Regulation on the Sharing of Confidential Information within the current Banking Law framework.

The accompanying BRSA Circular No. 2022/1 provides regulatory explanations concerning implementation of the confidentiality rules under Banking Law No. 5411.

Accordingly, a bank or BaaS project should separately ask:

Is the proposed disclosure permitted under KVKK?

and

Is the proposed disclosure permitted under banking confidentiality legislation?

A lawful personal data transfer is not necessarily a lawful disclosure of customer secrets.

26. BaaS Interface Providers and International Technology Groups

Banking as a Service can create particularly complicated data chains.

A typical structure may involve:

customer → Turkish interface provider → Turkish service bank → technology vendor → international group company.

Each transfer should be separately mapped.

The interface provider may process data as:

• its own controller for certain commercial services;
• processor or outsourcing provider for the bank in other circumstances.

The role may therefore change depending on the specific activity.

Multinational BaaS projects should not attempt to solve all data flows using a single generic group privacy clause.

27. Open Banking Providers

Open banking providers process highly detailed account and transaction information.

An Account Information Service Provider may aggregate financial data obtained from multiple payment accounts.

A Payment Initiation Service Provider may process information required to initiate payments.

Where such data is routed to:

• overseas analytics;
• foreign cloud providers;
• group-company risk teams;
• foreign software infrastructure,

Article 9 becomes relevant.

However, open banking providers must also remain within the purpose limitations imposed by payment-services regulation.

A cross-border transfer mechanism does not itself authorise the company to use account data for a new purpose.

28. Crypto Asset Service Providers

Crypto businesses also require careful transfer mapping.

A CASP may send information abroad for:

• blockchain analytics;
• sanctions screening;
• fraud scoring;
• cloud infrastructure;
• identity verification;
• Travel Rule messaging;
• cybersecurity.

The CMB’s current crypto regulatory framework subjects CASPs to extensive information systems and technological infrastructure requirements, and the CMB’s Information Systems Department is responsible for regulating and auditing CASP information systems.

A Turkish crypto company should therefore review both:

• KVKK transfer requirements; and
• CMB information systems requirements.

Particular attention should be paid to services that connect identifiable customers with blockchain wallet addresses.

29. Blockchain Information Can Become Personal Data

Blockchain addresses may appear pseudonymous.

However, once a regulated exchange connects a wallet address with:

• a named customer;
• identity information;
• KYC documents;
• transaction records,

the associated information can become personal data within the company’s systems.

Accordingly, sending wallet analytics to an overseas blockchain-analysis provider may involve more than transferring anonymous blockchain information.

The transfer should be assessed based on the information actually available to the recipient and the ability to identify the customer.

30. Foreign Group Companies

Multinational fintech groups frequently centralise functions such as:

• compliance;
• internal audit;
• risk management;
• cybersecurity;
• HR;
• financial reporting.

The fact that two companies belong to the same corporate group does not eliminate KVKK Article 9.

A Turkish subsidiary transferring personal data to its overseas parent generally requires a valid transfer mechanism in the same way as a transfer to an unrelated third party.

For groups with limited transfers, standard contracts may be sufficient.

For large, recurring and complex group flows, BCRs may become more efficient.

31. Intercompany Agreements Alone Are Not Enough

A common mistake is relying on an ordinary intra-group data processing agreement.

A group agreement can allocate responsibility and establish security requirements, but it does not automatically satisfy Article 9.

The company should determine whether the arrangement incorporates:

• the applicable Turkish standard contract;
• approved BCRs;
• another Article 9 safeguard.

The same principle applies to global vendor DPAs.

A vendor’s existing GDPR Data Processing Addendum may not by itself satisfy Turkish international transfer requirements.

32. GDPR Standard Contractual Clauses Are Not the Same as Turkish Standard Contracts

International fintech companies frequently already use European Commission Standard Contractual Clauses under the GDPR.

These clauses may remain relevant for European compliance.

However, Turkish law has its own official standard contract texts.

The Turkish Authority maintains four specific transfer modules and has also published English translations for convenience.

Therefore, signing EU SCCs alone should not automatically be treated as satisfying Turkish Article 9.

A Turkish transfer mechanism must be established separately.

33. Can the Turkish Standard Contract Be Signed in English?

The Authority has published English translations of the By-Law and standard contracts for international users.

However, the Authority’s 2026 guidance on execution states that where the standard contract is also executed in a foreign language, the Turkish contractual text must be properly signed.

Fintech companies should therefore avoid assuming that signing only the English translation is sufficient.

34. Sub-Processors Must Be Mapped

Cloud and SaaS vendors rarely operate entirely alone.

A primary vendor may use sub-processors for:

• hosting;
• security;
• support;
• messaging;
• analytics.

The Turkish fintech should therefore obtain an accurate list of the vendors that may receive customer information.

A standard contract with the primary provider should not become an excuse to ignore the broader processing chain.

The transfer mapping exercise should examine both direct and onward transfers.

35. Due Diligence of Foreign Data Importers

A fintech should not select a foreign vendor based only on commercial price and technical functionality.

The data importer should also be evaluated from a privacy and cybersecurity perspective.

Relevant questions include:

• Does the provider have adequate information security?
• Where will data be stored?
• Who can access it?
• Are sub-processors used?
• What happens after termination?
• How are data breaches reported?
• Can the Turkish fintech audit or obtain compliance evidence?
• Can data subject rights be supported?

Standard contracts establish legal protections, but operational due diligence remains necessary.

36. Data Breaches Involving Foreign Vendors

Cross-border outsourcing does not eliminate the Turkish data controller’s obligations.

Where a foreign processor experiences a security incident affecting Turkish customer information, the Turkish fintech may still need to assess notification obligations under KVKK.

Vendor agreements should therefore require rapid notification to the Turkish company.

A processor that promises to inform the fintech “within 30 days” of a breach may be commercially unacceptable given the Turkish regulatory notification timetable.

Incident response provisions should be negotiated with Turkish compliance obligations in mind.

37. International Data Transfers and MASAK

Fintech businesses also need to consider regulatory retention and confidentiality obligations under financial crime legislation.

Payment institutions, electronic money institutions and crypto asset service providers may process substantial KYC and transaction monitoring information under MASAK rules.

The fact that information is legally collected for AML purposes does not mean it can automatically be exported to every foreign group company.

The company should separately analyse:

• legal purpose of the international disclosure;
• Article 9 transfer mechanism;
• MASAK confidentiality or retention restrictions;
• sector-specific rules.

In particular, suspicious transaction reporting information requires extremely careful handling and should not be treated as ordinary customer analytics data.

38. Data Localisation and Cross-Border Transfer Are Different Concepts

These concepts are often confused.

Data localisation means that certain systems or information must remain physically or operationally within Türkiye.

Cross-border transfer compliance means that a transfer abroad is lawful under KVKK.

A company may satisfy Article 9 but still violate a localisation rule.

Likewise, storing a copy domestically does not automatically make an overseas copy lawful.

Both questions must therefore be answered independently.

This distinction is especially important for payment and electronic money institutions because the CBRT imposes specific domestic cloud and infrastructure requirements.

39. Cross-Border Data Transfer Due Diligence in Fintech M&A

International transfers should form a major part of regulatory due diligence when acquiring a Turkish fintech.

The buyer should review:

Data Map

Which data leaves Türkiye?

Vendor List

Which foreign cloud and SaaS vendors receive personal data?

Standard Contracts

Have the correct Turkish contracts been executed?

Five-Day Notifications

Were notifications submitted on time?

BCRs

Does the group rely on approved BCRs?

Foreign Access

Can overseas employees access Turkish customer systems?

Localisation

Do CBRT, BRSA or CMB rules restrict the relevant infrastructure?

Historic Transfers

Did data leave Türkiye before compliant safeguards were established?

Sub-Processors

Are onward transfers properly mapped?

Customer Notices

Do privacy notices accurately describe international transfers?

A Turkish fintech with excellent financial performance may still carry substantial historical privacy risk where its technology stack relies heavily on unstructured overseas data sharing.

40. Practical Cross-Border Transfer Project for a Fintech Company

A comprehensive compliance project can be organised into several stages.

Step 1 – Map All Systems

Create a list of:

• applications;
• cloud providers;
• vendors;
• group systems;
• analytics tools;
• KYC providers;
• support platforms.

Step 2 – Identify International Access

Determine whether any person or system outside Türkiye can access personal data.

Step 3 – Classify the Parties

For each transfer, determine whether the exporter and importer are:

• controller;
• processor.

Step 4 – Identify the Processing Basis

Confirm the underlying Article 5 or Article 6 processing condition.

Step 5 – Check Adequacy

Determine whether an adequacy decision applies.

As of July 2026, no country has yet been designated as adequate.

Step 6 – Select the Transfer Safeguard

Consider:

• standard contract;
• BCR;
• undertaking with Board approval.

Step 7 – Execute Correctly

Use the correct contract module and satisfy Turkish execution requirements.

Step 8 – Notify Within Five Business Days

Complete the standard contract notification.

Step 9 – Review Sector Regulation

Check whether CBRT, BRSA, CMB or other sector rules restrict the proposed architecture.

Step 10 – Monitor Changes

Review new vendors, new countries, new sub-processors and new processing purposes continuously.

41. Cross-Border Data Transfer Compliance Checklist

Before transferring fintech customer information outside Türkiye, the company should confirm:

Personal Data:
Does the information identify or make a person identifiable?

Transfer:
Will information be stored, disclosed or made accessible abroad?

Purpose:
Why is the transfer necessary?

Domestic Legal Basis:
Which Article 5 or Article 6 condition permits the underlying processing?

Adequacy:
Does a Board adequacy decision exist?

Safeguard:
Which Article 9 safeguard will be used?

Contract Module:
Has the correct standard contract type been selected?

Turkish Execution:
Has the Turkish version been properly signed?

Authority Evidence:
Can the signatories’ authority be demonstrated?

Notification:
Was the standard contract notified within five business days?

Sub-Processors:
Are onward transfers understood?

Sector Regulation:
Do CBRT, BRSA or CMB rules impose stricter requirements?

Cloud Location:
Where are production and backup systems located?

Foreign Access:
Can overseas support or group personnel access the data?

Security:
Does the foreign recipient maintain appropriate safeguards?

Privacy Notice:
Are customers properly informed regarding transfers?

Retention:
Is transferred data deleted when no longer necessary?

Frequently Asked Questions About Cross-Border Data Transfers in Turkey

What law governs international personal data transfers in Turkey?

The principal rule is Article 9 of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data. The Article was materially amended by Law No. 7499 and the new framework took effect on 1 June 2024.

What are the main ways to transfer personal data abroad?

The current system is based on:

1. adequacy decisions;
2. appropriate safeguards;
3. limited occasional exceptions.

Which countries are considered adequate under KVKK?

As of July 2026, the Authority states that the Board has not yet designated any country as providing adequate protection.

What is the most common transfer mechanism for fintech companies?

For ordinary vendor relationships, the Turkish standard contracts are likely to be one of the most practical options.

The correct mechanism nevertheless depends on the actual relationship.

How many Turkish standard contract types exist?

Four:

• controller to controller;
• controller to processor;
• processor to processor;
• processor to controller.

Must a standard contract be approved before data is transferred?

The statutory standard contract route does not require individual prior approval of each contract, but the signed contract must be notified to the Authority within five business days.

How long is the notification period?

Five business days after signing.

Can an EU GDPR SCC be used instead of the Turkish standard contract?

EU SCCs do not automatically replace the Turkish Article 9 mechanism. Türkiye has its own officially approved standard contract forms.

Can the Turkish standard contract be signed only in English?

The Authority has published English translations, but current guidance states that where a foreign-language version is also used, the Turkish contractual text must be properly executed.

Can the standard contract be modified?

Only limited optional or alternative provisions should be modified. The Authority warns against changes to the prescribed text outside those areas.

What are Binding Corporate Rules?

BCRs are an appropriate safeguard designed principally for recurring international transfers within multinational corporate groups.

The Turkish Board has published separate BCR procedures for controllers and processors.

Have BCRs actually been approved in Turkey?

Yes. The Board announced an approval granted on 20 May 2026, demonstrating that the BCR mechanism is operational under the current Article 9 regime.

Can explicit consent be used for transfers abroad?

Article 9 includes informed explicit consent among the exceptional transfer grounds, but these exceptions are intended for occasional rather than continuous transfers.

Can a fintech permanently use a foreign cloud based only on consent?

Relying on the occasional-transfer exception for continuous cloud infrastructure is generally problematic. Recurring transfers should normally be assessed under an appropriate safeguard such as standard contracts or BCRs.

Can a payment institution use an overseas cloud if it signs a KVKK standard contract?

Not necessarily.

Payment and electronic money institutions are also subject to CBRT information systems rules, including specific domestic cloud and infrastructure requirements. KVKK compliance does not override those sector rules.

Does storing data in Turkey mean there is no international transfer?

Not always.

Foreign remote access, overseas backups or foreign SaaS processing may still create an international data transfer depending on the actual data flow.

Does KVKK permit bank customer data to be freely transferred abroad?

No.

Banks must consider both KVKK and separate banking confidentiality rules under Banking Law and BRSA regulations.

Conclusion: How Fintech Companies Should Manage International Data Transfers in Turkey

Cross-border data transfers for fintech companies under Turkish law have become significantly more structured since the 2024 reform of KVKK Article 9.

The old approach of treating international transfers primarily as a consent issue is no longer sufficient.

Türkiye now applies a hierarchical system built around:

adequacy decisions, appropriate safeguards and limited occasional exceptions.

The new system entered into force on 1 June 2024 following Law No. 7499. It was supplemented by the July 2024 transfer By-Law, Turkish standard contracts and Binding Corporate Rules documentation.

For most commercial fintech arrangements, the first practical difficulty is that there is currently no Turkish adequacy-country list.

As of July 2026, the Personal Data Protection Authority states that no country has yet been designated as providing adequate protection.

Consequently, companies relying on international cloud providers, SaaS applications, analytics systems, KYC companies or foreign group infrastructure will frequently need an appropriate safeguard.

For many bilateral vendor relationships, the Turkish standard contracts will be the most practical mechanism.

Four contract modules exist depending upon whether the data exporter and importer act as controllers or processors.

However, using the standard contract correctly is essential.

A fintech should:

• determine the correct controller/processor classification;
• use the correct standard contract module;
• ensure the Turkish text is properly executed;
• avoid impermissible amendments;
• preserve evidence of signing authority;
• submit the required notification within five business days.

The Authority’s 2026 guidance demonstrates that these procedural requirements are not merely technical formalities. Incorrect signatures, unsupported authority, inappropriate amendments or attempts to backdate agreements can undermine compliance.

For multinational financial groups, Binding Corporate Rules may provide a more strategic long-term solution.

The Turkish BCR framework has also moved beyond theory. The Board announced an approval granted in May 2026, confirming that BCRs are functioning as a practical Article 9 safeguard for qualifying groups.

Fintech companies should nevertheless resist the temptation to treat Article 9 as the only relevant regulation.

This is particularly important in financial services.

A payment or electronic money institution may establish a technically valid KVKK transfer mechanism yet still face problems under the CBRT’s information systems rules.

The CBRT framework imposes specific domestic cloud requirements and requires qualifying community-cloud primary, secondary and backup infrastructure to remain in Türkiye.

Banks face an additional confidentiality regime under Banking Law No. 5411 and the BRSA’s Regulation on the Sharing of Confidential Information.

Crypto asset service providers must similarly consider the CMB’s information systems and technology requirements in addition to KVKK.

Therefore, the correct compliance question is never simply:

“Can this data be transferred under KVKK?”

The correct analysis is:

Can the data be lawfully processed?

Can it be transferred abroad under Article 9?

Does sector-specific financial regulation permit the same transfer and technological architecture?

All three questions must be answered.

International cloud arrangements require particularly careful analysis.

A fintech should map not only its primary servers but also:

• backups;
• disaster-recovery systems;
• technical support;
• telemetry;
• sub-processors;
• foreign group access.

A system physically hosted in Türkiye may still involve international transfers if foreign personnel can access personal data remotely.

Similarly, a vendor marketed as providing a “European cloud” does not automatically satisfy Turkish law.

The fintech must establish a Turkish Article 9 mechanism.

The same approach should be used in corporate groups.

A Turkish subsidiary does not receive an automatic exemption merely because personal data is sent to its foreign parent company.

The group must still implement a legally recognised transfer mechanism.

For limited bilateral transfers, this may mean standard contracts.

For complex multinational structures, BCRs may ultimately be more efficient.

Fintech M&A transactions should also include detailed review of historical cross-border transfers.

An investor acquiring a Turkish payment company, EMI, crypto platform or open banking provider should determine whether the target has:

• mapped international data flows;
• executed the correct Turkish standard contracts;
• submitted five-business-day notifications;
• properly structured foreign cloud arrangements;
• complied with sector localisation rules;
• controlled remote group access.

Failure in these areas can create regulatory liabilities that remain with the company after acquisition.

Ultimately, the most effective compliance strategy is to build cross-border data governance into technology procurement itself.

Before a fintech signs a foreign technology contract, the legal, privacy, compliance and information-security teams should know:

What personal data will the provider receive?

Where will it be processed?

Who else can access it?

Which Article 9 mechanism applies?

Does our financial regulator permit the architecture?

Can we terminate the transfer and recover or delete the data when the contract ends?

The answers should be determined before customer data is transmitted.

For businesses establishing or operating a payment institution, electronic money institution, open banking company, digital wallet, BaaS platform, crypto asset service provider or other fintech company in Turkey, international data transfers should therefore be treated as part of the core regulatory design of the business.

The central principle is straightforward:

A fintech company may use global technology, but global technology must be structured around Turkish data protection and financial-sector regulation.

Companies that establish a reliable data map, implement Article 9 safeguards, comply with notification requirements and reconcile KVKK with sector-specific localisation rules will be significantly better positioned to use international technology while maintaining regulatory compliance in Türkiye.

Legal Disclaimer: This publication provides general information concerning cross-border personal data transfers by fintech companies in Türkiye as of July 2026. It does not constitute legal advice. Adequacy decisions, standard contract procedures, BCR practices, sector-specific information systems rules and regulatory interpretations may change. Every international data transfer should be assessed individually based on the parties, processing purposes, data categories, technical architecture, recipient country and sector-specific regulatory framework applicable at the relevant time.