Abuse of Dominant Position Under Turkish Competition Law

Introduction

Abuse of dominant position is one of the most important areas of Turkish Competition Law. It concerns the conduct of undertakings that possess significant market power and use that power in a way that harms the competitive process. In Turkey, dominance itself is not unlawful. A company may lawfully become dominant through innovation, investment, efficiency, brand strength, superior technology, distribution power or commercial success. What Turkish law prohibits is the abusive use of that dominance.

The main legal provision is Article 6 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition. This article prohibits the abuse, by one or more undertakings, of a dominant position in a market for goods or services within the whole or part of Turkey. Article 6 applies whether the abuse is committed directly, through agreements with others, or through concerted practices. The official text of Law No. 4054 also defines dominant position as the power of one or more undertakings in a particular market to determine economic parameters such as price, supply, production and distribution by acting independently of competitors and customers.

For companies operating in Turkey, abuse of dominance rules are highly relevant. These rules may affect pricing strategies, discount systems, distribution arrangements, platform policies, access to infrastructure, data usage, refusal to supply, tying and bundling, exclusivity arrangements, digital marketplace rules, online advertising practices and technology ecosystems. A business that holds strong market power must therefore exercise greater caution than an ordinary market participant.

1. Legal Framework of Abuse of Dominance in Turkey

Turkish abuse of dominance law is primarily governed by Article 6 of Law No. 4054. The provision is similar in structure and purpose to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, but Turkish enforcement has its own procedural and practical characteristics.

Article 6 does not prohibit market power as such. A company may have a high market share or strong economic position without violating competition law. The legal problem arises when the undertaking uses its power to restrict competition, exclude rivals, exploit customers or impose unfair commercial conditions.

Law No. 4054 lists examples of abusive conduct. These include preventing competitors from entering the market, making competitors’ activities more difficult, discriminating between equal purchasers, tying one product or service to another, using dominance in one market to distort competition in another market, and restricting production, marketing or technical development to the prejudice of consumers. The list is not exhaustive, meaning that other forms of conduct may also be treated as abuse depending on their economic effects and legal context.

The enforcement authority is the Turkish Competition Authority, and decisions are made by the Competition Board. The Authority may conduct preliminary inquiries, full investigations, information requests and on-site inspections. If the Board finds an infringement, it may impose administrative fines, order the termination of the abusive conduct, accept commitments in suitable cases or impose behavioral measures.

2. What Is Dominant Position?

Dominant position refers to substantial market power. Under Turkish law, dominance is linked to the ability of an undertaking to act independently from competitive pressure. This does not necessarily mean that the undertaking is a monopoly. A company may be dominant even if other competitors exist in the market, provided that those competitors cannot effectively discipline its behavior.

Market share is an important indicator, but it is not the only factor. The Turkish Competition Board may also consider barriers to entry, buyer power, control over essential inputs, technological advantages, access to data, brand loyalty, distribution networks, financial strength, economies of scale, network effects, switching costs and vertical integration.

For example, a company with a high market share in a market with strong entry barriers, loyal customers, limited alternatives and significant data advantages may be considered dominant. Conversely, a high market share may not always prove dominance if entry is easy, customers have strong bargaining power and competitors can expand quickly.

The assessment is always market-specific. A company may be dominant in one product market but not in another. It may be dominant in a national market, regional market or narrower segment, depending on the relevant product and geographic market definition.

3. Relevant Market Definition

Dominance cannot be assessed without defining the relevant market. The relevant market analysis identifies the boundaries of competition. It asks which products or services are substitutable from the perspective of customers and which geographic area is relevant for competitive conditions.

For product market definition, the Competition Board may consider demand substitution, supply substitution, product characteristics, prices, intended use, customer preferences and switching possibilities. For geographic market definition, the Board may consider transport costs, regulatory barriers, distribution patterns, customer location, language, local market conditions and cross-border supply possibilities.

In digital markets, relevant market definition may be more complex. A platform may serve different user groups at the same time, such as consumers, advertisers, sellers, developers or content providers. In such multi-sided markets, market power may arise not only from prices but also from data, user base, network effects, switching costs, ecosystem dependency and control over access points.

The Turkish Competition Authority’s work on digital transformation emphasizes that data may be relevant to market definition, dominance assessment, merger analysis and abuse of dominance analysis. It also discusses how platform markets may raise competition concerns through data access, network effects and control over digital infrastructure.

4. Dominance Is Not Illegal; Abuse Is Illegal

A central principle of Turkish Competition Law is that dominance itself is not prohibited. A business is allowed to compete aggressively, develop better products, invest in technology, reduce costs and win customers. Competition law does not punish success.

However, dominant undertakings have a special responsibility not to impair the competitive process. This does not mean that a dominant company must protect inefficient competitors. It means that it must not use its market power to exclude equally efficient rivals, foreclose markets, impose unfair conditions or harm consumer welfare without objective justification.

This distinction is important in practice. A strong company may lawfully reduce prices, improve quality or expand distribution. But if below-cost pricing is designed to eliminate competitors and later recoup losses, it may be treated as predatory pricing. A company may lawfully choose its business partners, but a refusal to supply may become abusive if the input is indispensable and refusal eliminates effective competition. A company may lawfully offer discounts, but loyalty-inducing rebates may be abusive if they foreclose competitors.

5. Exclusionary Abuse

Exclusionary abuse occurs when a dominant undertaking makes it difficult for competitors to enter, survive or expand in the market. This is one of the most common categories of abuse of dominance in Turkey.

The Turkish Competition Authority’s materials on exclusionary conduct explain that the key question is whether the dominant undertaking’s conduct causes actual or potential anti-competitive foreclosure. Anti-competitive foreclosure means that actual or potential competitors are obstructed from access to supply sources or markets to the detriment of consumers. Consumer harm may appear as higher prices, lower quality, reduced innovation or less variety.

Common forms of exclusionary abuse include predatory pricing, refusal to supply, margin squeeze, exclusive dealing, loyalty rebates, tying and bundling, discrimination, self-preferencing, restricting interoperability, and using control over data or infrastructure to disadvantage rivals.

The core issue is not merely whether a competitor suffers harm. Competition law protects competition, not individual competitors. The legal question is whether the conduct harms the competitive process and consumer welfare.

6. Predatory Pricing

Predatory pricing occurs when a dominant undertaking sells below cost with the purpose or effect of excluding competitors and later benefiting from reduced competition. Low prices are generally good for consumers and are a normal part of competition. Therefore, predatory pricing analysis must be handled carefully.

A company with market power may raise competition law concerns if it applies prices that are not economically sustainable, targets competitors, sacrifices short-term profit to eliminate rivals and has the ability to recoup losses after competitors exit the market. Evidence may include internal strategy documents, pricing below relevant cost measures, targeted price cuts, market structure, entry barriers and subsequent price increases.

Predatory pricing is particularly relevant in sectors with high fixed costs, network effects, scale advantages or strong customer lock-in. Digital platforms, online services, retail chains, logistics networks and subscription-based models may face scrutiny where aggressive pricing appears designed to eliminate rivals rather than compete on the merits.

7. Refusal to Supply and Access to Essential Inputs

A dominant undertaking may generally choose its commercial partners. However, refusal to supply may become abusive in exceptional circumstances. This may arise where a dominant undertaking controls an indispensable input, infrastructure, network, platform, data source, facility, intellectual property interface or distribution channel.

A refusal to supply may be problematic where access is objectively necessary for competitors to operate in a downstream or neighboring market, refusal is likely to eliminate effective competition, and there is no objective justification. The analysis is highly fact-specific.

In traditional markets, refusal cases may involve access to physical infrastructure, spare parts, technical services, distribution networks or essential facilities. In digital markets, refusal cases may involve data, application programming interfaces, platform access, interoperability, app stores, payment systems or advertising infrastructure.

The Turkish Competition Authority’s digital transformation work discusses the growing importance of access to data, networks and infrastructure in dominance analysis, especially where refusal may eliminate effective competition in upstream or downstream markets.

8. Margin Squeeze

Margin squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated dominant undertaking supplies an input to downstream competitors while also competing with them in the downstream market. If the difference between the wholesale input price and the downstream retail price is insufficient for an efficient downstream competitor to operate profitably, the conduct may exclude rivals.

This risk is common in regulated or infrastructure-heavy sectors such as telecommunications, energy, transport, payment systems, digital advertising, platform services and essential technology infrastructure.

A margin squeeze analysis usually examines whether the dominant undertaking controls a necessary input, whether downstream competitors depend on that input, whether the dominant undertaking’s pricing leaves an insufficient margin, and whether competitors are likely to be foreclosed.

9. Tying and Bundling

Tying occurs when customers are required or pressured to purchase one product or service together with another. Bundling may involve offering multiple products together as a package. These practices are not always unlawful. They may generate efficiencies, reduce transaction costs and improve user experience. However, when a dominant undertaking uses tying or bundling to extend market power into another market, competition concerns arise.

Article 6 expressly identifies tying as a possible form of abuse. The Turkish Competition Authority’s digital transformation report explains that tying is defined under Article 6(c) as making the purchase of one good or service conditional upon another and that the analysis considers whether tied and tying products are distinct and whether the practice may lead to anti-competitive foreclosure.

Tying and bundling are particularly significant in technology markets. A dominant platform may tie one application to another, require default installation, restrict uninstalling, bundle payment services with marketplace access, or make access to one digital service conditional on accepting another data or advertising service.

10. Discrimination and Unfair Trading Conditions

Article 6 also covers discrimination between equal purchasers for equal and equivalent rights, obligations and acts. Discriminatory conduct may become abusive where a dominant undertaking applies different prices, terms, access conditions or service quality without objective justification and thereby distorts competition.

Discrimination may occur in wholesale supply, platform ranking, access to data, delivery conditions, technical support, rebate systems, payment terms, advertising inventory, marketplace commissions or API access.

Unfair trading conditions may also raise concerns. A dominant undertaking may abuse its position by imposing unfair prices, excessive fees, unreasonable contractual terms, unilateral changes, data exploitation, unjustified penalties or disproportionate obligations. These issues are becoming increasingly important in digital platform and online marketplace cases, where business users may depend heavily on access to the platform.

11. Excessive Pricing

Excessive pricing is a form of exploitative abuse. It concerns prices that are unfairly high in relation to the economic value of the product or service. Competition authorities usually approach excessive pricing carefully because price regulation is not the normal function of competition law. However, in exceptional cases, excessive pricing may be examined where a dominant undertaking has durable market power and customers lack realistic alternatives.

Excessive pricing cases may arise in markets with legal monopolies, infrastructure bottlenecks, essential goods, pharmaceuticals, digital platforms, network services or other sectors where customers are locked in. The analysis may involve comparison with costs, profit margins, prices in comparable markets, historical prices and economic value.

For companies with strong market power, price increases should be supported by objective commercial reasons such as cost increases, investment needs, product improvement, risk allocation or market conditions. Internal documents suggesting exploitation of customer dependency may create significant risk.

12. Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets

Digital markets have become a major focus of Turkish competition enforcement. Online marketplaces, app stores, search engines, social media platforms, digital advertising systems, payment services, food delivery platforms, online music platforms and data-driven ecosystems may all create dominance issues.

The Turkish Competition Authority has stated in its contribution on digital markets that abuse of dominance cases in digital markets have increased and now represent a significant part of the workload of the relevant enforcement department.

Digital dominance may arise from network effects, data accumulation, economies of scale, user lock-in, ecosystem integration, default settings, control over ranking, access to sellers, control over advertising inventory or switching costs. Abusive conduct may include self-preferencing, tying services, restricting interoperability, refusing access to data, discriminatory ranking, excessive data collection, exclusionary platform rules, parity clauses, predatory pricing or unfair treatment of business users.

Recent enforcement examples show the practical importance of this area. In 2024, Reuters reported that Turkey’s competition authority imposed a significant fine on Google for alleged misuse of dominance in ad server services, including favoring its own supply-side platform. In 2025, Reuters also reported that the Authority launched an investigation into Spotify concerning possible discriminatory practices and predatory pricing in the online music streaming sector.

13. Objective Justification and Efficiency Defenses

A dominant undertaking may defend its conduct by showing objective justification or efficiency benefits. Not every exclusionary effect is unlawful. Some practices may be necessary for quality control, safety, capacity management, intellectual property protection, prevention of free riding, investment incentives, technical integrity or cybersecurity.

For example, a refusal to supply may be justified by capacity constraints, credit risk, objective quality standards or technical incompatibility. A rebate system may be justified by cost savings or volume efficiencies. A tying arrangement may be justified by technical integration, product safety or improved consumer experience.

However, the justification must be credible, proportionate and supported by evidence. If a less restrictive alternative exists, the defense may fail. Companies should document their commercial rationale before implementing conduct that may affect competitors or dependent business partners.

14. Investigations by the Turkish Competition Authority

Abuse of dominance investigations may begin through complaints, ex officio review, market studies, sector inquiries, information from customers or competitors, or evidence obtained in another investigation.

The Authority may first conduct a preliminary inquiry. If the Competition Board finds serious and sufficient indications of infringement, it may open a full investigation. During the investigation, the Authority may request written information, conduct interviews, examine market data and perform on-site inspections.

For companies under investigation, the first step should be evidence preservation. The company should secure relevant emails, contracts, pricing documents, internal reports, platform rules, data policies, discount files and communications with customers or competitors. It should also conduct an internal legal assessment to understand the facts and prepare a defense strategy.

15. On-Site Inspections and Digital Evidence

The Turkish Competition Authority has broad powers to conduct on-site inspections. In abuse of dominance cases, officials may examine electronic records, emails, internal presentations, mobile devices, pricing systems, platform algorithms, correspondence with business partners and strategic documents.

Digital evidence is especially important in dominance cases because internal documents often reveal the company’s commercial strategy, perception of market power, views on competitors and objectives behind pricing or access policies. Statements such as “we can block competitors,” “customers have no alternative,” “we should make switching difficult,” or “we will force sellers to use our service” may be damaging.

Companies should have a dawn raid protocol. Employees should cooperate with officials but avoid speculation, document destruction or obstruction. IT teams should be trained, legal counsel should be contacted immediately, and the company should keep records of copied materials.

16. Administrative Fines and Remedies

If the Competition Board finds an abuse of dominance, it may impose significant administrative fines. Under Law No. 4054, substantive competition law violations may lead to fines of up to 10% of the annual gross revenue of the relevant undertaking. Managers or employees with decisive influence in the infringement may also face personal fines up to a percentage of the undertaking’s fine.

The Board may also order the undertaking to terminate the infringement and restore competition. Depending on the case, this may involve changing contracts, ending discriminatory practices, providing access on fair terms, modifying platform rules, removing exclusivity, changing rebate systems, stopping tying practices or implementing compliance measures.

In suitable cases, commitment procedures may allow the undertaking to offer remedies without a full infringement finding. However, commitments must effectively eliminate the competition concerns and are not available for all types of serious conduct.

17. Private Damages Claims

Abuse of dominance may also lead to private damages claims. Customers, competitors, distributors, business users or other affected parties may seek compensation if they suffer loss because of unlawful conduct.

Damages claims may follow a Competition Board decision, especially where the decision establishes abusive conduct. Potential damages may include lost profits, overcharges, exclusion from market opportunities, additional costs, reduced sales, or harm caused by discriminatory or unfair terms.

For dominant undertakings, civil exposure should be considered from the beginning of any investigation. A regulatory defense strategy should be aligned with litigation risk, settlement risk and commercial relationships.

18. Competition Compliance for Dominant Undertakings

A company with significant market power should implement a dominance-specific compliance program. General antitrust training focused only on cartels is not enough. Dominant undertakings need special rules for pricing, rebates, refusals to supply, access to infrastructure, platform governance, data use, discrimination, exclusivity and internal language.

A strong compliance program should include:

• market power monitoring;
• legal review of pricing and discount policies;
• approval procedures for refusal to supply;
• objective criteria for platform access and ranking;
• fair and transparent rules for business users;
• documentation of commercial justifications;
• training for sales, product, legal, IT and management teams;
• review of tying, bundling and exclusivity practices;
• dawn raid preparation;
• internal reporting channels.

The most important principle is evidence-based decision-making. A dominant undertaking should be able to explain why a business practice is necessary, proportionate and beneficial to consumers or efficiency, rather than exclusionary or exploitative.

19. Practical Risk Areas for Foreign Investors

Foreign investors acquiring or operating a strong Turkish business should assess dominance risks during legal due diligence. A target company may have hidden exposure in its contracts, dealer systems, platform rules, pricing policies, data practices, rebate systems or refusal-to-supply decisions.

Technology investors should pay particular attention to data access, interoperability, ecosystem lock-in, self-preferencing and user consent. Industrial investors should examine exclusivity, distribution, spare parts, after-sales services and input supply. Retail and FMCG companies should review rebates, shelf-space arrangements, category management and supplier/customer discrimination. Infrastructure and regulated sector investors should assess access obligations and margin squeeze risks.

Dominance risk is not only a legal issue. It affects valuation, transaction documents, warranties, indemnities, post-closing integration and compliance remediation.

Conclusion

Abuse of dominant position under Turkish Competition Law is a sophisticated and highly practical area of legal risk. Article 6 of Law No. 4054 does not punish dominance itself, but it prohibits dominant undertakings from using their market power in a way that harms competition.

The main categories of abuse include exclusionary conduct, predatory pricing, refusal to supply, margin squeeze, tying and bundling, discrimination, unfair trading conditions, excessive pricing and digital platform abuses. In modern markets, dominance may arise not only from traditional market share but also from data, network effects, technological dependency, ecosystem control, switching costs and platform access.

Companies operating in Turkey should assess whether they hold market power and, if so, whether their commercial practices may restrict competitors, exploit customers or reduce consumer welfare. For dominant undertakings, proactive compliance is essential. Pricing, access, data, distribution, platform governance and internal communications should be reviewed carefully.

A well-designed Turkish competition compliance program can reduce investigation risk, protect commercial reputation and support sustainable market leadership. For foreign investors, Turkish abuse of dominance rules should be considered before market entry, M&A transactions, digital platform launches, distribution restructuring and major pricing decisions.