Introduction
The Turkish automotive industry is one of the most important and competition-sensitive sectors in Turkey. It includes passenger cars, light commercial vehicles, heavy vehicles, motorcycles, spare parts, repair and maintenance services, authorized dealers, independent repairers, distributors, importers, fleet companies, leasing companies, used car platforms, online listing services, insurance-related repair networks and public procurement processes.
Because of this complex structure, the automotive sector creates multiple competition law risks. Vehicle manufacturers and importers work with authorized distributors and dealers. Dealers sell new and used vehicles, provide after-sales services and sometimes operate in financing, insurance, maintenance and spare parts channels. Independent repairers and spare parts suppliers compete with authorized networks. Online platforms compete in used car listing, online vehicle purchase and sale, search advertising and lead generation. Fleet sales and public tenders may create risks of bid coordination or information exchange.
The main legal framework is Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition, which prohibits restrictive agreements, concerted practices, decisions of associations of undertakings, abuse of dominant position and mergers or acquisitions that may significantly lessen competition in Turkey. Law No. 4054 applies to undertakings operating in or affecting Turkish markets, including foreign companies whose conduct affects Turkey.
The automotive sector also has a specific block exemption regime. Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2017/3 on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicles Sector regulates the conditions under which certain vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector may benefit from exemption from Article 4 of Law No. 4054. The Communiqué concerns vertical agreements regarding the purchase, sale or resale of new motor vehicles, spare parts and repair and maintenance services.
For companies active in the Turkish automotive industry, competition compliance is not a formal legal exercise. It directly affects dealer agreements, distribution networks, after-sales services, spare parts supply, resale price policies, online sales, advertising practices, data sharing, tender conduct, M&A transactions and digital platform strategies.
1. Why the Automotive Sector Is Competition-Sensitive
The automotive sector is structurally complex. Competition does not occur only at the moment of new car sales. It continues throughout the life cycle of the vehicle. A consumer may first buy a new car from an authorized dealer, then purchase maintenance services, spare parts, insurance repairs, warranty repairs, accessories, software updates, financing, extended warranty products and eventually sell the vehicle in the second-hand market.
This multi-stage structure creates different relevant markets. New vehicle distribution, used vehicle sales, repair and maintenance services, original spare parts, equivalent spare parts, independent repair services, online vehicle platforms, fleet sales and public procurement may each require separate competition law analysis.
The Turkish Competition Board’s decision in the online used car market underlined that the automotive sector is characterized by product differentiation and that competition is based not only on price but also on effective marketing, ability to respond to demand, model development, product variety and the prevalence of service networks. The same decision described the Turkish automotive sector as having two key segments: new cars sold through authorized distributors and used cars traded in the second-hand market.
This sectoral structure means that competition risks may arise at several levels: between vehicle brands, between dealers of the same brand, between authorized and independent repairers, between spare parts suppliers, between used car platforms and between bidders in fleet or public procurement processes.
2. Article 4 Risks: Agreements Restricting Competition
Article 4 of Law No. 4054 prohibits agreements, concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings that restrict competition. In the automotive industry, Article 4 risks may arise from horizontal coordination between competitors or vertical restrictions imposed within distribution and service networks.
Horizontal risks include price fixing between dealers, coordination in public tenders, market sharing between distributors, customer allocation in fleet sales, exchange of sensitive sales data between competing dealers and coordination between used car platforms. Vertical risks include resale price maintenance, restrictions on passive sales, unlawful online sales restrictions, excessive non-compete clauses, spare parts restrictions and limitations on independent repairers.
The legal risk does not depend only on written agreements. The Turkish Competition Authority may examine emails, WhatsApp messages, dealer meeting notes, price lists, bonus systems, internal presentations, customer allocation records, tender documents, platform data and trade association communications. Informal understandings and concerted practices may also fall within Article 4.
3. Resale Price Maintenance in Vehicle Distribution
Resale price maintenance is one of the most common risks in automotive distribution. It occurs when a supplier, importer, distributor or manufacturer directly or indirectly restricts the dealer’s ability to determine its resale price.
In practice, automotive RPM may arise where an importer tells dealers not to sell below a certain price, imposes maximum discount rates, requires approval for campaigns, threatens dealers that discount aggressively, reduces bonuses because of low resale prices, limits vehicle allocation to price-cutting dealers, or uses online monitoring to pressure dealers.
Suppliers may have legitimate interests in protecting brand image, preventing misleading advertising and ensuring service quality. However, Turkish competition law generally does not allow a supplier to impose fixed or minimum resale prices on independent dealers. Recommended prices may be used only if they are genuinely non-binding. Maximum prices may be possible if they do not operate as fixed or minimum prices in practice.
Automotive companies should train sales managers carefully. Statements such as “do not go below this price,” “correct your online price,” “the brand price must be protected,” or “your discount damages the dealer network” may become evidence of RPM.
4. Authorized Dealer Networks and Intra-Brand Competition
Authorized dealer networks are central to automotive sales in Turkey. They allow manufacturers and importers to maintain brand standards, showroom quality, technical training, customer experience, financing processes, test drive standards and after-sales coordination. However, dealer networks must not eliminate lawful competition between dealers.
Intra-brand competition refers to competition between dealers selling the same brand. Even where dealers belong to the same authorized network, they are usually independent undertakings and should normally remain free to compete on price, service, delivery time, financing support, accessories, campaigns and customer relations.
A supplier may impose quality standards and brand requirements, but it should not use those standards to restrict price competition unnecessarily. Dealer meetings should not be used to coordinate discounts, regional customer allocation or fleet pricing. Dealers should not exchange future pricing plans or customer-specific offers with each other.
Dealer scorecards, bonus systems and sales targets should also be reviewed. A bonus system may be lawful if it rewards sales volume, customer satisfaction or service quality. It becomes risky if it effectively penalizes dealers for offering discounts or selling to customers outside a protected region.
5. Exclusive Territories, Active Sales and Passive Sales
Automotive distribution agreements often allocate territories to dealers. Territory allocation may support investment in showrooms, local marketing and service infrastructure. However, territorial protection must be carefully structured.
Turkish vertical agreement practice distinguishes between active sales and passive sales. Active sales involve targeted efforts toward customers or territories allocated exclusively to another dealer. Passive sales involve responding to unsolicited customer demand. In many vertical systems, limited active sales restrictions may be possible, while passive sales restrictions are treated much more strictly.
In the automotive sector, a dealer may be prevented from opening a showroom in another dealer’s exclusive territory under certain conditions. However, preventing a dealer from responding to an unsolicited customer inquiry from another city may create competition law risk. Similarly, prohibiting online inquiries or forcing redirection of customers based only on location may restrict passive sales.
Dealership agreements should therefore avoid broad clauses such as “the dealer may sell only within its territory.” A more competition-compliant approach is to define permitted restrictions precisely and preserve the dealer’s ability to respond to unsolicited customers.
6. Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2017/3
The motor vehicle sector has a dedicated block exemption regime in Turkey. Communiqué No. 2017/3 was introduced for vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector and determines the conditions for exemption from Article 4 of Law No. 4054. The official text states that its purpose is to determine the conditions under which vertical agreements in the motor vehicles sector may be exempted as a group from the application of Article 4.
The Communiqué is important because automotive distribution and after-sales arrangements often contain restrictions that require sector-specific assessment. New motor vehicle distribution, spare parts supply, authorized service networks and repair and maintenance services may each require different analysis.
The Turkish Competition Authority’s annual reports continue to refer to Communiqué No. 2017/3 and the guidelines explaining the block exemption regime for vertical agreements in the motor vehicles sector, showing that this framework remains a relevant part of Turkish competition law practice.
Companies should not assume that every dealer agreement automatically benefits from the block exemption. The agreement must satisfy the conditions of the Communiqué and must not include hardcore restrictions. If the conditions are not met, individual exemption analysis may be required.
7. After-Sales Services and Repair Networks
After-sales services are one of the most important competition law areas in the automotive industry. Vehicle owners need maintenance, repair, warranty services, technical diagnostics, spare parts, software updates, recall services and accident repairs. These services may be provided by authorized repairers or independent repairers.
Competition concerns arise when authorized networks restrict independent repairers’ ability to compete. For example, an importer or manufacturer may limit access to technical information, diagnostic tools, spare parts, repair manuals, software updates or training. If such restrictions prevent independent repairers from providing effective services, competition law concerns may arise.
After-sales markets may be particularly sensitive because consumers often face lock-in after purchasing a vehicle. A customer who buys a car may later depend on compatible spare parts, authorized service systems or technical repair information. If competition in after-sales markets is restricted, consumers may face higher repair costs, fewer service options and reduced quality.
Automotive companies should review authorized repairer agreements, spare parts supply conditions, warranty policies and technical information access rules. Quality and safety standards are legitimate, but they should not be used as disguised exclusionary tools.
8. Spare Parts Competition
Spare parts markets are central to automotive competition. Original spare parts, equivalent-quality spare parts, aftermarket parts, accessories and consumables may be supplied by vehicle manufacturers, authorized distributors, independent producers, wholesalers, retailers and repairers.
Competition risks may arise if manufacturers or importers restrict authorized repairers from using equivalent spare parts where legally permissible, limit independent suppliers’ access to the market, impose exclusive purchasing obligations, refuse to supply essential parts without objective justification, or use warranty policies to force customers into authorized channels.
Spare parts restrictions can also affect insurance-related repairs. If accident repair networks are tied to certain spare parts suppliers or authorized repairers without objective justification, this may reduce competition and increase costs.
A lawful spare parts strategy should distinguish between safety-critical parts, warranty-related requirements, brand protection, counterfeit prevention and unnecessary foreclosure of independent suppliers. Documentation of objective quality reasons is essential.
9. Warranty Policies and Competition Law
Warranty policies can create competition law risk when they restrict consumers’ freedom to use independent repairers or alternative spare parts. A manufacturer may legitimately require that warranty repairs be performed according to technical standards and may reject warranty coverage for damage caused by improper repair or unsuitable parts. However, a broad rule that all maintenance must be performed only at authorized services may raise concerns if it unnecessarily excludes independent repairers.
The key issue is proportionality. A warranty policy should protect product quality, safety and proper functioning, but it should not be used to lock consumers into the authorized network for all services where such restriction is not necessary.
Automotive companies should draft warranty terms carefully and ensure that dealers and service centers communicate them accurately. Misleading statements such as “your warranty is automatically void if you use any independent repairer” may create legal and competition risks depending on the circumstances.
10. Fleet Sales and Corporate Customers
Fleet sales are commercially important in the automotive industry. Rental companies, leasing companies, logistics operators, public institutions, municipalities, private corporations and public service providers may purchase large numbers of vehicles.
Fleet sales may create competition law risks because dealers and distributors may be tempted to coordinate customer allocation or discount levels. For example, dealers of the same brand may agree not to compete for a particular corporate customer. Competing vehicle brands may exchange information about fleet tender pricing. Leasing companies may coordinate residual value assumptions, service packages or customer allocation.
Fleet sales teams should independently determine pricing, discounts, financing terms, delivery schedules and service packages. Communications with competitors should be strictly controlled. Where multiple dealers of the same brand are invited to quote, the supplier should avoid coordinating their offers unless a lawful agency or centralized sales structure applies.
11. Public Procurement and Bid Rigging
Automotive companies may participate in public tenders for passenger vehicles, buses, trucks, ambulances, municipal vehicles, police vehicles, service vehicles, spare parts, maintenance services, tires, fuel-related services and fleet management.
Bid rigging is a serious Article 4 risk. It may occur through cover bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation, market allocation or coordinated subcontracting. A bidder may submit a deliberately high offer so that another bidder wins. Competitors may agree that one company will win a municipal tender while another will win the next one. Dealers may divide public institutions by region.
Tender teams should be trained not to discuss bid prices, participation plans, technical offers, customer allocation, discounts, subcontracting compensation or withdrawal decisions with competitors. Joint bidding may be lawful where objectively necessary, but it must not be used to eliminate competition between companies that could bid independently.
12. Used Car Markets and Online Platforms
Used car markets have become increasingly digital in Turkey. Online listing platforms, online car purchasing businesses, auction models, dealer marketplaces, instant sale tools and algorithmic pricing systems are now important competitive channels.
The Competition Board’s online used car decision described the used vehicle market as having numerous players, including car dealers, individual sellers, rental companies and undertakings involved in purchasing and selling vehicles. The decision also identified online and offline channels and noted differences in business models, including platforms acting as intermediaries and undertakings that purchase and sell cars through online channels.
Competition risks in used car platforms may include algorithmic coordination, negative keyword agreements in search advertising, exchange of vehicle pricing data, restrictions on dealer access, self-preferencing by listing platforms, exclusivity clauses, discriminatory advertising visibility, data-related market power and collusion between online buyers.
In the Arabam.com settlement decision, the Board examined allegations involving rival undertakings active in online used car purchase and sale and their agreement to add each other’s brand names to negative keyword lists in Google search advertising. The decision concluded within the settlement framework that such practices restricted competition in the online used car market through negative keyword agreements for Google text ads.
This is an important example for automotive companies because it shows that competition law risks in the automotive sector are no longer limited to traditional dealer networks. Online advertising, search auctions and platform visibility can also become competition law issues.
13. Search Advertising and Digital Marketing Risks
Automotive companies increasingly compete through digital channels. Dealers, used car platforms, importers and service providers use search advertising, social media campaigns, marketplace ads, comparison tools and lead generation platforms.
Digital marketing may create competition law risk if competitors agree not to bid on each other’s brand names, mutually add negative keywords, restrict search visibility, divide advertising channels or coordinate online campaign strategies. The Arabam.com decision demonstrates that agreements concerning Google Ads negative keywords may be examined under Article 4 where they restrict competition in online automotive services.
Companies should therefore treat digital marketing teams as part of competition compliance. Marketing employees should not enter into agreements with competitors about keywords, search ads, campaign timing, online leads, advertising bids or brand-name restrictions unless the arrangement has been legally reviewed.
14. Information Exchange Between Automotive Competitors
The automotive sector generates extensive data: vehicle sales, stock levels, delivery times, dealer margins, discounts, fleet prices, spare parts sales, repair volumes, labor rates, warranty claims, used car prices and residual values. Some data sharing may be lawful, especially if historical, aggregated and anonymized. However, sharing current or future commercially sensitive information between competitors may violate Article 4.
Risky information includes future price increases, discount plans, fleet customer offers, stock allocation, production constraints, tender participation, dealer margins, spare parts pricing, service labor rates and customer lists.
Information exchange may occur through trade associations, dealer meetings, industry events, market research firms, software providers, online platforms or informal communications. Automotive companies should use strict data-sharing protocols. Benchmarking should be managed by independent third parties and structured to prevent identification of individual competitor data.
15. Trade Associations in the Automotive Sector
Automotive trade associations and sectoral organizations may serve legitimate purposes. They may provide regulatory updates, technical standards, safety discussions, sustainability projects, electrification policy input and training. However, they also bring competitors together.
Association meetings should not involve future prices, dealer margins, discount strategies, fleet tender plans, wage policies, production limits or customer allocation. Associations should avoid recommended price lists, common labor rate recommendations, standard commercial margins or coordinated boycott calls.
Meeting agendas should be reviewed in advance. Minutes should be kept. If an improper topic arises, company representatives should object and leave if the discussion continues. Trade association participation should be included in automotive compliance programs.
16. Electric Vehicles, Charging Infrastructure and New Competition Issues
The transition to electric vehicles creates new competition law questions. EV distribution, battery services, software updates, connected vehicle data, charging infrastructure, charging station access, payment systems, roaming arrangements and after-sales diagnostics may all become competition-sensitive.
Potential issues include exclusive charging network access, refusal to provide interoperability, discriminatory treatment of charging operators, tying vehicle sales to charging services, restricting independent repair access to EV diagnostics, data access for connected vehicles and software-based after-sales limitations.
EV markets may also create merger control concerns where automotive manufacturers acquire charging networks, software companies, battery technology firms or data platforms. Companies active in EV ecosystems should assess competition law risks early because market structures are still developing and early contractual choices may shape future competition.
17. Abuse of Dominance in Automotive Markets
Article 6 of Law No. 4054 prohibits abuse of dominant position. Dominance itself is not unlawful, but abusive conduct is. In automotive markets, dominance may arise in a specific spare part, diagnostic system, repair technology, local after-sales market, online listing platform, brand-specific service network or essential input.
Potential abuses may include refusal to supply spare parts, discriminatory access to technical information, excessive pricing in exceptional circumstances, tying repair services to parts, margin squeeze between wholesale and retail channels, exclusionary rebates, refusal to provide software access, or discriminatory platform ranking.
A company with strong market power should document objective justifications for supply decisions, access restrictions, warranty rules, service requirements and pricing policies. Safety, quality and anti-counterfeit concerns may be legitimate, but they should be proportionate and consistently applied.
18. Merger Control in the Automotive Sector
Mergers and acquisitions in the automotive sector may require Turkish Competition Board approval if they meet notification thresholds and involve a change of control. Transactions may involve vehicle distributors, dealers, spare parts suppliers, repair chains, tire companies, leasing companies, fleet management firms, used car platforms, charging infrastructure providers or automotive technology businesses.
Merger analysis may examine horizontal overlaps, vertical foreclosure, access to spare parts, dealer network concentration, after-sales effects, data assets, regional market power, platform effects and potential competition. Serial acquisitions of dealerships or repair networks may also create cumulative concentration concerns.
Foreign-to-foreign automotive transactions may be notifiable in Turkey if the parties have Turkish turnover or Turkish market effects. Transaction teams should screen Turkish merger control early and avoid closing before clearance where notification is required.
19. Administrative Fines and Legal Consequences
Violations of Turkish competition law may lead to significant administrative fines. Under Law No. 4054, substantive violations of Articles 4, 6 and 7 may result in fines of up to 10% of annual gross revenues. Managers or employees with decisive influence in the infringement may also face personal exposure.
The consequences may also include invalidity of restrictive clauses, termination of unlawful conduct, private damages claims, reputational harm, dealer disputes, public tender consequences and operational disruption. In the automotive sector, where brands depend heavily on dealer trust, consumer confidence and regulatory credibility, reputational damage can be as significant as financial sanctions.
20. Competition Compliance Program for Automotive Companies
Automotive companies should implement sector-specific competition compliance programs. Generic antitrust policies are not enough because automotive markets involve special risks in distribution, after-sales services, spare parts, fleet sales, digital advertising and used car platforms.
A strong automotive compliance program should include:
Dealer pricing rules and RPM training.
Guidance on active and passive sales restrictions.
Review of authorized dealer and service agreements.
Spare parts and technical information access policies.
Warranty communication rules.
Fleet sales and tender compliance procedures.
Trade association participation protocols.
Used car platform and digital advertising review.
Information exchange controls.
Merger control screening for acquisitions.
Dawn raid preparedness.
HR and labor market competition rules.
Internal reporting and investigation procedures.
Training should be practical. Sales teams should understand pricing risks. Dealer network managers should understand passive sales and territory rules. Service teams should understand spare parts and independent repairer issues. Marketing teams should understand search advertising risks. Tender teams should understand bid rigging rules.
21. Practical Contract Drafting Tips
Automotive agreements should be drafted with competition law in mind. Dealer agreements should preserve resale pricing freedom. Recommended prices should be clearly non-binding. Territory clauses should distinguish active and passive sales. Online sales restrictions should be objective and proportionate. Service standards should protect quality without excluding independent competition unnecessarily.
Spare parts agreements should avoid unjustified exclusive supply restrictions. Warranty terms should not mislead consumers or unnecessarily restrict independent repair. Dealer bonus systems should reward legitimate performance criteria rather than price conformity. Digital advertising clauses should not restrict competition in search auctions without legal justification.
Actual practice must match the written contract. A compliant agreement will not protect a company if emails, messages or sales team behavior show unlawful pressure.
Conclusion
Competition law risks in the Turkish automotive industry are broad, practical and increasingly digital. The sector includes new vehicle sales, authorized dealers, after-sales services, spare parts, independent repairers, fleet sales, public tenders, used car platforms, online advertising, electric vehicles and automotive data services. Each of these areas may create distinct Turkish competition law risks.
Law No. 4054 prohibits anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices, abuse of dominance and mergers or acquisitions that may significantly lessen competition. The motor vehicle sector also has a specific block exemption regime under Communiqué No. 2017/3, which applies to vertical agreements involving new motor vehicles, spare parts and repair and maintenance services.
The most important automotive competition risks include resale price maintenance, unlawful territory restrictions, passive sales restrictions, after-sales foreclosure, spare parts restrictions, warranty-related lock-in, fleet tender collusion, sensitive information exchange, trade association risks, digital advertising coordination, used car platform practices, abuse of dominance and merger control failures.
For automotive manufacturers, importers, dealers, repairers, spare parts suppliers, platforms, fleet companies and foreign investors, proactive compliance is essential. Contracts should be reviewed, employees should be trained, digital marketing practices should be monitored, dealer communications should be controlled and M&A transactions should be screened. A well-designed competition compliance program can protect automotive businesses from investigations, fines, disputes and reputational harm while supporting lawful and sustainable growth in the Turkish market.
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