Introduction
Abuse of economic dependence and platform power in Turkey has become one of the most important legal topics for digital marketplaces, e-commerce platforms, app stores, online advertising businesses, delivery platforms, travel platforms, payment systems, software ecosystems, business users and foreign technology companies operating in the Turkish market.
The rise of digital platforms has changed the traditional relationship between suppliers, sellers, consumers and intermediaries. Many businesses now depend on online platforms to reach customers, process payments, appear in search rankings, receive reviews, advertise products, access logistics and collect sales data. This dependency may create commercial imbalance even where the platform’s market power does not always fit neatly into traditional dominance analysis.
Under Turkish Competition Law, the core legal framework is Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition. Article 4 prohibits restrictive agreements and concerted practices; Article 6 prohibits abuse of dominant position; and Article 7 regulates mergers and acquisitions that may significantly lessen competition. Article 6 specifically prohibits abuse by one or more undertakings of their dominant position in a market for goods or services within all or part of Turkey.
However, it is important to clarify a key point: Turkish competition law does not operate a broad, standalone “abuse of economic dependence” doctrine in the same way as some jurisdictions. In unilateral conduct cases, dominance remains the primary condition for applying Article 6. Current commentary on Turkish digital competition law also notes that dominance is the primary condition for Article 6 and that there are no separate dedicated criteria for establishing market power in digital markets.
This does not mean that economic dependence is irrelevant. It may be highly relevant in assessing platform power, seller dependency, market definition, barriers to entry, data advantages, network effects, unfair commercial practices, exploitative conduct, discrimination and exclusionary behavior. In practice, the concept of economic dependence often appears indirectly through dominance analysis, digital platform regulation, e-commerce legislation, unfair commercial practice rules and private contractual disputes.
1. What Is Economic Dependence?
Economic dependence describes a situation where one undertaking relies heavily on another undertaking for access to customers, suppliers, data, infrastructure, distribution channels, payment systems or essential commercial opportunities. In platform markets, a small seller may depend on a marketplace to reach consumers. A restaurant may depend on a food delivery platform. An app developer may depend on an app store. A hotel may depend on a travel booking platform. A merchant may depend on a payment or advertising platform.
Economic dependence does not always mean legal dominance. A business may be commercially dependent on a platform even if the platform’s market share does not clearly establish dominance under competition law. For example, a seller may derive most of its sales from one marketplace because consumers prefer that channel, even though alternative platforms exist. The legal question is whether that dependency also reflects market power capable of restricting competition.
In Turkish law, economic dependence becomes legally significant when it overlaps with concepts such as dominance, superior bargaining power, platform gatekeeping, unfair commercial practices or abusive contractual conduct.
2. Platform Power in Turkish Competition Law
Platform power refers to the ability of a digital platform to influence the commercial behavior of business users, consumers or competitors. A platform may gain power through user numbers, network effects, data ownership, brand recognition, logistics integration, payment systems, advertising tools, search ranking, reviews, seller dependency and default consumer habits.
The Turkish Competition Authority has recognized that abuse of dominance cases in digital markets have become increasingly important. In its contribution on abuse of dominance in digital markets, the Authority stated that applications and examinations concerning abuse of dominance in digital markets had increased over the previous decade and made up a significant part of the workload of the relevant enforcement department.
Digital platforms are especially sensitive because they often act in multiple roles at the same time. A marketplace may be both an intermediary and a seller. A platform may host third-party businesses while also competing with them. A search or advertising platform may control visibility while selling its own advertising products. The Turkish Competition Authority has expressly noted that e-marketplaces may raise concerns where market power stems from data ownership and network effects, especially where platforms act both as platform owners and sellers on the same platform.
3. Dominance vs. Economic Dependence
Dominance and economic dependence are related but not identical.
Dominance is a legal concept under Article 6 of Law No. 4054. The law defines dominant position as the power of one or more undertakings to determine economic parameters such as price, supply, production and distribution by acting independently of competitors and customers.
Economic dependence is broader and more factual. It may exist where one business cannot realistically switch to alternative partners without serious commercial harm. For example, a marketplace seller may technically have other channels but may lose most sales if removed from a leading platform. A restaurant may have direct delivery options but may still rely on a delivery app because customers use that app as their primary discovery channel.
In Turkish competition law, economic dependence alone does not automatically trigger Article 6. A claimant or complainant usually needs to show that the platform or undertaking is dominant in a relevant market and that the conduct is abusive. However, dependency may help prove market power, barriers to switching, lock-in, lack of alternatives or exploitative effects.
4. Article 6 and Abuse of Platform Power
Article 6 of Law No. 4054 prohibits abuse of dominant position. The law lists examples of abuse, including preventing competitors from entering a market, complicating competitors’ activities, discrimination between equivalent purchasers, tying, leveraging dominance into another market and restricting production, marketing or technical development to the prejudice of consumers.
In platform markets, possible abuses may include:
Self-preferencing by ranking the platform’s own products above third-party sellers.
Using non-public seller data to compete against sellers.
Discriminatory treatment of business users.
Unfair commission structures.
Restricting sellers’ ability to use rival platforms.
Imposing broad parity or most-favored-nation clauses.
Tying logistics, payment or advertising services to platform access.
Unjustified account suspension.
Restricting data portability or interoperability.
Refusing access to essential platform infrastructure.
The main issue is whether the platform competes on the merits or uses its gatekeeper position to distort competition. A dominant platform may impose quality rules, fraud controls or consumer protection measures, but those rules must be objective, proportionate and non-discriminatory.
5. Digital Market Features That Strengthen Platform Power
Digital platforms often have characteristics that make market power difficult to assess using traditional tools. The Turkish Competition Authority has identified issues such as zero-price markets, network effects, market tipping, lock-in effects and multi-homing as factors requiring careful consideration when defining markets and establishing market power in digital markets.
Network effects arise when a platform becomes more valuable as more users join it. A marketplace with many consumers attracts sellers; more sellers attract more consumers. This can create a self-reinforcing cycle.
Data advantages allow platforms to improve recommendations, pricing, search rankings, fraud detection, advertising and product development. Data can become a barrier to entry if rivals cannot replicate it.
Lock-in effects occur when users or sellers find it difficult to switch because of reviews, ratings, customer history, saved data, subscription models, integration costs or platform-specific tools.
Multi-homing limitations arise where users or sellers could theoretically use multiple platforms but practically rely on one main platform because maintaining multiple channels is costly or inefficient.
Market tipping occurs when one platform becomes so strong that competitors struggle to remain viable.
These factors are highly relevant when analyzing platform power in Turkey.
6. E-Commerce Marketplaces and Seller Dependence
E-commerce marketplaces are the clearest example of platform dependency. Sellers may rely on a marketplace for visibility, consumer traffic, payment systems, logistics, advertising, campaign participation, customer reviews and dispute resolution. If a marketplace suspends a seller, changes ranking rules, increases commissions or restricts access to campaigns, the seller’s business may be seriously affected.
Turkey also has a separate e-commerce regulatory framework that addresses some platform-business user imbalances. The Regulation on Electronic Commerce Intermediary Service Providers and Electronic Commerce Service Providers, published in the Official Gazette in December 2022, regulates obligations of intermediary service providers, unfair commercial practices, unlawful content, intermediation agreements, licenses and related issues.
The Regulation prohibits unfair commercial practices that significantly disrupt the commercial activities of e-commerce service providers, reduce their ability to make reasonable decisions or force them into commercial relationships they would not normally accept. Examples include failure to make payments within the required period, forcing sellers to sell promotional goods or services, unilateral changes to sales prices and charging fees where no service is provided or where the service type and fee are not specified in the intermediation agreement.
This e-commerce framework does not replace competition law, but it is highly relevant to platform dependency. A practice may raise both e-commerce regulatory concerns and competition law concerns depending on the platform’s market power and the effect on competition.
7. Self-Preferencing
Self-preferencing is one of the most important risks in platform power cases. It occurs when a platform gives preferential treatment to its own products, services or affiliates over third-party business users.
For example, an online marketplace may use search ranking to promote its own products. A platform may provide better advertising tools to its own retail arm. A delivery platform may rank affiliated restaurants more favorably. An app store may favor its own applications. A marketplace may use seller data to identify profitable products and then launch competing private-label goods.
The competition law risk is strongest where the platform is dominant or holds gatekeeper-like power. In such cases, business users may be unable to avoid the platform, and self-preferencing may reduce competition in downstream markets.
A platform may argue that ranking is based on objective factors such as price, delivery time, consumer rating or relevance. To reduce legal risk, ranking rules should be transparent, objective, consistent and not designed to exclude independent business users.
8. Use of Seller Data
Data is a central issue in platform power. Platforms collect data about prices, sales volume, conversion rates, returns, consumer behavior, product popularity, advertising performance, stock levels and customer reviews. This data may be necessary to operate the platform, but it can also be used strategically.
A platform that competes with its own sellers should be especially careful. If it uses non-public seller data to identify successful products, undercut sellers, copy strategies or create preferential campaigns, abuse concerns may arise where the platform has market power.
The Turkish Competition Authority has emphasized that e-marketplace platforms may create potential anti-competitive concerns through pricing, platform services and supply practices, particularly where they operate both as platform owners and sellers.
Data governance should therefore be a core part of platform compliance. Platforms should define what data is collected, who can access it, whether it is used for platform operation or competitive decision-making, and whether firewalls are needed between marketplace and retail teams.
9. Unfair Commission and Fee Structures
Platform dependency may also appear in commission and fee structures. A powerful platform may charge high commissions, mandatory advertising fees, logistics fees, payment fees, visibility fees or campaign participation costs. High fees are not automatically unlawful, but they may raise concerns where the platform is dominant and business users have no realistic alternative.
Competition law analysis would consider whether the fees are exploitative, discriminatory or exclusionary. E-commerce regulation may also be relevant where a fee is charged without a specified service or where the type of service and fee are not clearly stated in the intermediation agreement. The Regulation specifically treats charging a fee without service, or without specifying the service type and amount or rate in the agreement, as an unfair commercial practice.
For compliance, platforms should clearly disclose fees, define services, avoid arbitrary charges and apply conditions consistently.
10. Account Suspension and Delisting
One of the strongest signs of platform dependency is the impact of account suspension. If a seller is delisted from a major platform, its sales may collapse. A platform may need suspension powers to fight counterfeit goods, fraud, consumer harm, unlawful content, unsafe products or breach of platform rules. However, arbitrary or discriminatory suspension may raise legal risks.
A dominant platform should have clear rules for suspension, warning, cure periods, evidence review and appeal mechanisms. Sudden delisting without objective reason may be challenged as discriminatory or exclusionary.
E-commerce regulation also requires structured relationships through intermediation agreements and imposes duties on platforms concerning unlawful content and seller information. These obligations support the broader principle that platform-business user relationships should be transparent and predictable.
11. Parity Clauses and Economic Dependence
Parity clauses, also called most-favored-nation clauses, may require sellers not to offer better prices or terms on other platforms or their own websites. A powerful platform may use parity clauses to prevent sellers from steering customers to cheaper channels.
Such clauses can strengthen platform power by reducing price competition between platforms. If sellers cannot offer lower prices on rival platforms, new platforms may struggle to compete by offering lower commissions. Sellers become more dependent on the dominant platform, and consumers may lose discounts.
Parity clauses should be assessed under Article 4 where they restrict competition through agreement, and under Article 6 where imposed by a dominant platform. Their legality depends on scope, duration, platform power, market coverage and efficiency justifications.
12. Tying and Bundling by Platforms
Platform power may also be abused through tying or bundling. A platform may require sellers to use its logistics service, payment service, advertising tools, fulfillment program or data analytics service as a condition of platform access.
Some bundled services may be efficient. Integrated logistics may improve delivery quality, consumer experience and fraud control. Payment integration may increase security. However, if a dominant platform forces sellers to buy additional services without objective necessity, or if it excludes competing logistics or payment providers, Article 6 concerns may arise.
Article 6 expressly includes tying-related conduct and leveraging dominance into another market as examples of abusive behavior.
The safer approach is to make ancillary services optional unless there is a clear and proportionate justification.
13. Discrimination Between Business Users
A platform may discriminate between equivalent sellers by applying different commission rates, campaign access, visibility, logistics conditions, payment terms or suspension standards. Discrimination may be lawful where based on objective factors such as service level, sales volume, consumer ratings or fulfillment quality. It becomes risky where similar sellers are treated differently without legitimate justification.
Article 6 lists discrimination between purchasers with equal status as a possible abuse of dominance. In platform markets, “equal status” analysis may be complex because sellers differ in category, size, rating, fulfillment method and consumer complaint history. For this reason, platforms should document objective criteria and apply them consistently.
14. Refusal to Provide Access
Some platforms may become essential gateways. If a business cannot reasonably reach customers without access to a platform, refusal to provide access may create competition concerns. This is especially sensitive where the platform is dominant and the refusal prevents effective competition.
A platform may refuse access for legitimate reasons such as fraud, illegal products, unsafe goods, repeated consumer complaints, non-payment or breach of objective rules. But refusal should not be used to exclude competitors, punish sellers using rival platforms or favor the platform’s own services.
The assessment will depend on market definition, dominance, necessity of access, objective justification and effect on competition.
15. Digital Advertising and Platform Power
Platform power is not limited to marketplaces. Online advertising platforms may control search visibility, ad auctions, audience data, measurement tools and publisher access. In December 2024, Reuters reported that Turkey’s competition authority fined Google for misusing its dominant position in ad server services and required Google to provide third-party supply-side platforms with conditions similar to those applied to its own services.
This example shows how platform power can arise in infrastructure markets that ordinary consumers may not see directly. Online advertising ecosystems can involve conflicts of interest where the same company operates multiple layers of the advertising stack.
Businesses dependent on digital advertising should therefore consider competition risks not only in consumer-facing platforms but also in adtech, data access and measurement services.
16. Meta, Data Integration and Platform Ecosystems
Platform power can also arise from data integration across services. In 2024, Reuters reported that the Turkish antitrust authority ended a probe into Meta’s Threads and Instagram data-sharing after Meta made commitments, including allowing Threads users to access the platform independently of Instagram accounts and keeping Threads data separate from Instagram unless users choose to merge accounts.
This type of case illustrates a key digital competition concern: ecosystem power. A company controlling several related platforms may use data integration, account linking, default settings or cross-platform advantages to strengthen its position. Competition law concerns may arise where such integration forecloses rivals or reduces user choice.
17. Digital Age Policy Developments
The Turkish Competition Authority continues to examine digital markets as a policy priority. In April 2026, the Authority announced the launch of a “Competition Policies in the Digital Age” study to identify existing and potential competition issues in digital markets and evaluate intervention tools.
This development is important because platform power may not always be fully addressed by traditional dominance tools. Digital markets move quickly, and enforcement authorities may need sector inquiries, market studies, interim measures, commitments, ex ante rules or legislative reforms to address structural dependency.
Businesses operating digital platforms in Turkey should therefore follow both enforcement decisions and policy initiatives. Compliance must be forward-looking.
18. Abuse of Economic Dependence and Contract Law
Economic dependence may also appear in private contractual disputes. A seller may argue that a platform imposed unfair terms because the seller had no realistic alternative. A distributor may complain that a supplier terminated access abusively. A business user may challenge unilateral fee changes, forced campaigns or discriminatory treatment.
These disputes may involve commercial law, contract law, e-commerce regulation, consumer law and competition law. The legal strategy depends on whether the platform is dominant, whether the conduct restricts competition, whether statutory e-commerce obligations apply and whether the contractual term is unfair or invalid.
A complaint before the Turkish Competition Authority may be appropriate where the conduct affects market competition. A contractual or commercial claim may be more appropriate where the dispute is bilateral and does not show broader market effects.
19. Administrative Fines and Legal Consequences
If platform conduct violates Articles 4, 6 or 7 of Law No. 4054, the Turkish Competition Board may impose administrative fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s annual gross revenues. Managers or employees with decisive influence in the infringement may face personal fines of up to 5% of the fine imposed on the undertaking. The Board considers factors such as recurrence, duration, market power, decisive influence, compliance with commitments, cooperation and severity of actual or potential harm.
The legal consequences may also include behavioral remedies, commitments, termination of unlawful practices, private damages claims, invalidity of restrictive agreements and reputational harm.
For platforms, a remedy may be more disruptive than a fine. A platform may be required to change ranking systems, data practices, commission structures, access rules, interoperability conditions or self-preferencing practices.
20. Compliance Program for Platforms in Turkey
A platform operating in Turkey should implement a competition compliance program tailored to digital business models. Traditional antitrust policies are not enough.
The program should cover:
Market power and dominance monitoring.
Seller access and suspension criteria.
Ranking and recommendation algorithms.
Use of non-public seller data.
Self-preferencing risks.
Commission and fee transparency.
Parity and exclusivity clauses.
Advertising tools and visibility rules.
Tying of logistics, payment or fulfillment services.
Data portability and interoperability.
Complaint-handling procedures.
E-commerce intermediation agreement obligations.
Merger control screening for platform acquisitions.
Dawn raid preparedness for digital evidence.
Product, engineering, sales, data and legal teams should all be trained. Competition law compliance should be integrated into platform design, not added later as a legal afterthought.
21. Practical Checklist for Platform Power Risk
Companies should ask the following questions:
Do sellers depend heavily on our platform for sales?
Do we compete with our own business users?
Do we use non-public seller data for our own retail decisions?
Are ranking rules objective and transparent?
Can sellers challenge suspension or delisting decisions?
Do we impose parity clauses or restrict multi-homing?
Do we force sellers to use our logistics, payment or advertising services?
Do commission rules apply consistently?
Do we treat equivalent sellers differently?
Do we have data firewalls between marketplace and retail teams?
Could our conduct exclude rival platforms?
Have we reviewed e-commerce regulatory obligations?
Do we have internal documentation showing objective justifications?
If the answer to any question creates concern, the platform should obtain Turkish competition law advice and revise its practices.
22. Practical Checklist for Business Users
Sellers and business users dependent on platforms should also protect themselves.
They should keep records of unilateral changes, fee increases, delisting notices, ranking changes, forced campaigns, payment delays, discriminatory treatment, data-access restrictions and communications with platform representatives.
They should review the intermediation agreement carefully. They should compare treatment with similar sellers. They should assess whether the platform has market power and whether the conduct affects competition beyond a private dispute.
Where appropriate, business users may consider complaints under e-commerce regulation, commercial litigation, interim relief, mediation, competition law complaints or private damages actions.
Conclusion
Abuse of economic dependence and platform power in Turkey is a developing and strategically important legal area. Turkish competition law does not currently create a general standalone abuse of economic dependence regime independent from dominance. For unilateral conduct, Article 6 of Law No. 4054 remains centered on abuse of dominant position. However, economic dependence is highly relevant in practice because it helps explain platform power, seller vulnerability, switching barriers, lock-in effects, data advantages and unfair commercial conditions.
Digital platforms may create competition concerns through self-preferencing, use of seller data, discriminatory ranking, unfair fees, parity clauses, tying, access restrictions, account suspension, data integration and ecosystem leverage. The Turkish Competition Authority has already identified digital markets, e-marketplaces, data ownership and network effects as important enforcement and policy areas.
At the same time, Turkey’s e-commerce regulation addresses unfair commercial practices by intermediary service providers, including conduct that significantly disrupts sellers’ activities, reduces their decision-making capacity or forces them into unwanted commercial relationships.
For platforms, proactive compliance is essential. Platform rules must be transparent, objective, proportionate and non-discriminatory. Seller data should be governed carefully. Ranking systems should be auditable. Suspension rules should allow fair process. Ancillary services should not be tied without justification. Business users should not be exploited merely because they depend on the platform.
For sellers, dependency should be documented. If platform conduct harms their business, they should evaluate whether the issue is contractual, regulatory, competition-based or all three.
As digital markets continue to grow in Turkey, platform power will remain under close legal scrutiny. Companies that understand the interaction between dominance, economic dependence, e-commerce regulation and competition compliance will be better positioned to operate lawfully and sustainably in Turkey’s digital economy.
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